[ENG] An interview with Professor Zbigniew Rau, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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The Three Seas Initiative is a group of countries located between three seas: the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black, and between two powers: Germany and Russia – countries stretching from Estonia in the north to Croatia in the south. Is there a common identity of this region – something that distinguishes it from Western Europe?
There are many distinctions common to us all. However, we should put Austria out of picture, whose history was different because it was an empire for several centuries until World War I. Apart from it, all the other countries in our region have had similar experiences. Above all, each of our countries has lost its independence at least twice in the last five hundred years. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, after a period of instability caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the empires managed to put Europe in order. For the powers it was the end of the troubles, a 19th century version of Francis Fukuyama’s „end of history.” But for the peoples of our region, it was not the end of troubles at all, but only the beginning of new ones. If we look at the map from that time, we can see that between the great powers: Prussia, Austria, Russia and Turkey – that is, where the Three Seas region extends today – there was only one sovereign state. That was… Montenegro. The result of the long-term loss of independence was the experience of a lack of subjectivity. When the neighbouring powers fought each other, did so on our soil. When they made peace, it was at our expense. For them we were always a periphery, a province, a buffer. As a result, for a long time we did not have our own institutions and experience of public life, which would assume subjectivity. There was no institutional stability characteristic to the West at that time. In the 19th century no one here thought in terms of elections, parliamentarism, or representativeness. Here, people thought from one armed uprising to another. Politics was practiced in the forests, in the streets, in conspiracy. That is why politics was experienced in a very personal and emotional way. After the Congress of Vienna For Western political elites, the value was social peace and stability. This, however, was unacceptable to nations without independence. They aspired to change the status quo. What did Mickiewicz pray for? For a great war of nations. That is why this part of the world was the quintessence of political instability. That’s why World War I came out of here, then World War II, and finally the Cold War.
But, after all, the lack of independence and subjectivity was not our only historical experience. We had other political traditions that also took its toll.
There, I would like to refer to the thought of one of the most eminent modern political philosophers, the French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, who in the first half of the 19th century noticed that despite the common European foundation there are two political traditions on our continent: absolutist and republican. The absolutist tradition was represented by the Germans, the French and the Austrians, while the republican tradition was represented by the English, the Hungarians and the Poles. At the same time, as de Tocqueville pointed out, only the Poles and Hungarians never gave in to the temptation of absolutism, since England in Tudor times had such a sordid experience behind it. During 2015 we celebrated the 800th anniversary of the Great Charter of Liberties (Magna Charta Libertatum), of which the English are still incredibly proud. But let’s remember that seven years after the English – in 1222, a very similar document was passed in Hungary: The Golden Bull of King Andrew II. Polish state privileges also come from the Middle Ages. Their common feature is the limitation of the monarch’s power by law and a guarantee of basic rights for the serfs. Both the subject and the ruler were subject to the law, and the law itself institutionalized their cooperation. Thus, our Central European experience of freedom under the rule of law was parallel to the Anglo-Saxon experience. It involved the experience of building our own institutions, canons of public life, ideas of representation, separation of powers, the limited nature of state power, etc. It was our own and natural experience. It involved our religion freedom of conscience, inviolability of property, participation in public life, and the right of resistance. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów), which was a state of Poles and Lithuanians, there was also religious tolerance and freedom, what was unique in Europe. We were not able to continue this experience of medieval state monarchy because our countries were oppressed by powers that did not know such freedom. For the Hungarians this happened after the Battle of Mohacz in 1526, for the Czechs after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, and for the Poles and Lithuanians after the Partitions of Poland in 1795. According to Toqueville, Europe is also divided according to another criterion: into metropolises and peripheries, what is a  second breakup of our continent. Our region got between such political forces that it was reduced to the role of a province either of European absolutisms or of Muslim despotism, as in the case of Hungarians conquered by Turkey. From that time on, our nations began to live in between a past that was longed for, a present that was not accepted, and a future that was fought for. It was a functioning between the memory and myth of one’s own institutionalized past and the experience of being deprived of all political achievements. This made us very different from Western Europe, which developed along a different path.
In this context, you speak of a common constitutional identity for the countries of our region. What does this mean?
When we talk about constitution, we usually mean modern constitutions. Such an act of our Constitution of May 3rd of 1791 – the first in Europe and the second in the world after the United States constitution. But I mean the earlier foundations of the political system, which found their expression in many legal acts dating back to the Middle Ages. It was from these that the experience of freedom under the rule of law was born.             Remarkably, this experience is reflected in the contemporary constitutions of Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic. If we take a look at their preambles, in which the axiology of the political community is contained, we shall see that they all contain the same two elements.  The first is a reference to the best of our own medieval political traditions, and the second is gratitude and recognition for all those who fought for the freedom and independence of these countries. This is an important part of our constitutional identity that distinguishes us from the countries of Western Europe. In none of the constitutions there is no reference to medieval political principles or to the heroes who fought to regain independence. This is not their experience, but ours.
And how are we different from Eastern Europe?
I disagree with Milan Kundera that what distinguishes the West from the East is an Orthodox religion and tradition. After all, Romania is religiously Orthodox, but culturally deeply  in the West. What determines the specificity of Eastern Europe, especially Russia, is the mixture of Orthodox, Byzantine tradition with the Tatar-Mongolian heritage. The mixture of these traditions has had the greatest impact on shaping the institutions of public life, social practices, and attitudes toward authority, law, and property.             In addition, the criteria for success in public life, especially in politics, were different. In Poland they were linked to the vision of the common good as the criterion for a republican system. In Russia, on the other hand, from Ivan Kalita to Joseph Stalin, the criterion for political success was the expansion of the national territory in each generation. In the name of this, one had to submit unconditionally to authority and avoid public discourse.
Now that we have defined the identity of Central Europe as a result of our history, let’s move on to the present. How does the Three Seas Initiative looks like at  this background?
In the past we have had projects for the unification of our region that were not imposed on us from outside, but came from within, such as the Great Moravia or the kingdoms under the Jagiellonian dynasty, but they did not last long. A more common experience was the sharing of our lands by neighbouring powers. This was an important part of our common existence for hundreds of years.             At the moment we are facing a process of becoming aware of our common identity, resulting from similar historical experiences. This involves a realisation of our common civilisational and economic interests and, above all, the need to ensure our own security. If one has a history like ours, knows that the question of security is crucial. That is why the countries of Central Europe had no dilemma as to whether or not they should join NATO.             If we understand that we have so many converging interests, then the logical conclusion is that we can do some things together. The Tri-Moros is therefore a coalition of the willing. Of course, this willingness is not the same in every sphere. However, we all want to develop transport, energy and digital infrastructure. We all want to eliminate the civilisational and economic delay with regard to Western Europe. The Tricity is an opportunity for our regional businesses to develop and to avoid the trap of medium-term development.             Let us note that a barrier to business development in our countries is  too small internal market. To be a businessman in the USA, where 320 million people live is not a challenge. The real challenge is to do big business in Slovakia, where 5.5 million people live. The effect  is decisive. In addition, companies from Central Europe are not able to break through in the West because the concerns there have been there for decades. To enter the Western market, our entrepreneurs would have to spend so much money on promotion and advertising that they would stop being competitive. In this situation, the opportunity for our domestic business (Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Croatian, Romanian, etc.) is precisely the Three Seas Initiative. Meanwhile, our trade with the West is much greater than our trade with each other. So it is time to make new connections.
What are today’s goals of Three Seas Initiative?
 
Let us note that the idea of the Three Seas Initiative was born only a few years ago, it has not yet been institutionalised, it does not even have its own secretariat, and yet it has already become a significant political fact. I am not even sure that a joint secretariat is necessary. And so cooperation of individual governments on specific projects remains crucial. The more such common links there are, the more objectives automatically emerge. A lot depends on money, though. Central Europe is an area where there is not enough money to maintain the region on its own. It is a question of historical legacy, the curse of a periphery long run by foreigners. As a result, we are too poor and there has been no accumulation of capital that could be used for investment. That is why we need outside contributions, such as the billions of dollars of American aid for infrastructural development. Hence the idea of the Three Seas Fund, to which more and more people are applying.
But why did the Americans support the Three Seas?
Plainly, our interests coincide with theirs. For them, Three Seas is an alternative to the Chinese Zone. In addition, the eastern flank of NATO is important to them. And if they see our region as strategically important, they need to invest in it, not only militarily but also in terms of infrastructure. History after World War II shows that where American soldiers start to be stationed (e.g. in Japan, South Korea or Western Europe), there comes prosperity. Why? Because there is security and stability, and therefore investments are made, the free market works, etc.
But is it not the case that only Republicans in the US care about the Three Seas Initiative, while the Democrat’s camp has other foreign policy priorities?
Since the early 1990s, I have been hearing that the Americans need to turn away from Europe and take up the Pacific region. But the world is so multipolar that correcting policy vectors does not amount to one simple reversal. Yes, American interests are being redefined, but they are still identified with a presence on our continent and in our region. It was very different in the 1990s, when Russia was ruled by Yeltsin and China was self-absorbed. Today the situation is radically different: under Putin, Russia has returned to a neo-imperialist policy and China has recognised that it needs to expand its influence in the world, which the Americans perceive as a threat to themselves.             The resolution adopted on 18 November by the House of Representatives of the US Congress proves that the Three Seas Initiative is important not only for Republicans but also for Democrats. Representatives of both parties voted unanimously in favour of the document. Although at the same time they were fiercely arguing for the presidency, they found a common language in the Three Seas Agreement. Together they defined the fundamental interests of the United States, regardless of who would sit in the White House or have a majority in Congress.
However, there are voices saying that the Three Seas Initiative is a threat to the cohesiveness of the European Union.  
It is quite the opposite. This is not an alternative, but a great boon to the European Union. After all, the Three Seas Project aims to stop the divisions in Europe in terms of civilization and economy. It is about formulating, conceptualizing and pursuing our interests, but not in opposition to the European Union. Our societies feel the need to align their standard of living with the West, they do not accept their backwardness, they are more hungry for economic success. Due to their achievements, they are more motivated to work, more mobile and less demanding. Our hunger for success is a great opportunity for the European Union.  
Thank you for the interview.
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